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1. Introduction 
In this paper we investigate whether innovation activities generate economic quasi-
rents and if the magnitude of such quasi-rents is affected or not by market structure conditions 
and firm's characteristics. The data is provided by the ESEE survey on Spanish manufacturing 
firms and covers the period 1990-93. The methodology used in the paper measures the rents of 
innovation taking into account that part of such rents are captured by workers with higher 
wages, and therefore accounting profits do not properly estimate economic rents. 
The interests on the determinants of innovation activity by business firms has fuelled an 
active field of research. Kamien and Schwartz (1982), Cohen and Levin (1989), and Cohen 
(1995) are excellent surveys in this topic on different moments of time, but all of them traizing 
the roots of the research to the fundamental insights of Schumpeter (1975). Our paper draws 
from this literature to formulate the hypothesis to be tested, but incorporates some distinct 
features which are explained bellow. 
Firms will undertake innovation activities if the expected revenues of such activities 
compensate the certain costs for the resources dedicated to them. Therefore if we are able to 
isolate and measure the net benefits of innovations activities and relate them to characteristics 
of the firm and of the market in which the firm operates, then we will know better what 
determines the incentives to innovate. In fact, most of the previous literature has focused on the 
factors that determine the resources that a particular firm dedicates to R&D activities. I 
Presumably, if one firm dedicates more resources to R&D, it is because it expects higher profits 
from the new processes or products that will come out of them, but we believe that it is of 
interest to know if, in fact, R&D activities increase profitability; if the increase in profitability 
ISee Scherer (1980), Kamien and Schwartz (1982), Levin et al. (1985) or Baldwin and Scott (1987) for 
surveys of the two main factors, firm size and market structure, which condition the R&D. 
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varies according to the type of innovation (product or process); and if the size of innovation 
rents depends upon variables such as the growth or the concentration of the market. These are 
the main concerns of the paper. 
One important methodological issue in this line of research is how to approximate 
innovation activity. Most often, input measures such as R&D effort (expenditures in R&D 
relative to value added and number of workers in R&D activities relative to total number of 
workers) are selected. However, R&D inputs take time before they generate intermediate 
outputs such as new products, patents and process improvements. Moreover, since they are 
often treated as current expenditures by the firms then, in the short run, a negative association 
between R&D effort and accounting profits may be detected.2 
In this paper innovation activity is measured by a dummy variable that assigns the 
value of I to a firm that in a given year has introduced a product innovation, a process 
innovation or both, a product and process innovation. The measure has limitations because it is 
not possible to calibrate the importance of the innovation, but at least all the innovations 
recognised by the firms are properly registered. The paper also considers the fact that 
accounting profits will not be a proper measure of innovation rents if part of such rents goes to 
the workers in the form of higher wages.3 Previous research by the author has shown that 
among the firms of the sample there is evidence that innovating firms pay higher wages, ceteris 
paribus. Therefore, the measurement of the size of the rents generated by the innovation 
activity will control for this evidence. 
The econometric estimation of the empirical model uses panel data techniques. Given 
the dynamic nature of the model, we apply a new instrumental variables method to achieve 
consistency in the estimation of the parameters and improve efficiency (Arellano and Bover 
2 As Kamien and Schwartz (1982) pointed out, in that case the R&D is measuring the cost rather than an 
investment so it would be reasonable to find an inverse relationship. 
3See Martinez-Ros (1995). 
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(1995), Blundell and Bond (1995)). The estimation procedure also takes into account the 
endogeneity problem generated by the simultaneous determination of profits and some 
explanatory variables such as market share. 
Our results show that innovation generates rents and therefore firms have economic 
incentives to pursue innovation activities. We also find that process innovations generate more 
rents than product innovations and that the control for the fact that part of the rents are captured 
by the employees has significant effects in the estimation of the size of such rents. Finally, the 
empirical results show that innovation rents are inversely related to the product market 
concentration, i.e., they are lower in more concentrated markets than in less concentrated ones. 
If less concentrated markets are also more competitive, then innovation rents are higher in more 
competitive markets, a result consistent with the predictions of Arrow (1962) who postulates 
that firms in more competitive markets are able to obtain more rents from innovations because 
competition implies lower profits before the innovation is introduced. Monopolists, on the 
other hand, have higher profits to begin with, so innovation has a lower incremental effect on 
them (replacement effect). 
The plan of the paper is the following. In Section 2 the main hypothesis are presented, 
toguether with a basic theoretical formalization. Section 3 contents the empirical model and a 
description of the variables and their measurement. Section 4 describes the data base. The 
discussion of the empirical results is presented in Section 5; overall conclusions and extensions 
close the paper. 
2. Innovating rents, firm's characteristics, and market conditions 
The decision to innovate is determined by the relation between the benefits and cost 
associated with such decision. In this section we present an overview of the literature on the 
determinants of the innovation rents (differences between benefits and costs), in particular the 
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relationship between the rents and the type of innovation (product and process), and the 
relationship between innovation rents and product market (demand growth, product 
differentiation and market competition), and labour market conditions. 
Innovation is an heterogeneous activity. Lunn (1986) and Kraft (1990), for example, 
point out the differences in the innovative processes and activities of product and process 
innovations. In general, process innovations are aimed at introducing technological advances 
which reduce production costs and, eventually, will help to gain market share from the 
competitors. Product innovations, on the other hand, expand the production opportunities set 
and in some cases allow for gains in efficiency due to scope economies. If innovation implies 
also more product differentiation, then the innovating firms may lower the price-elasticity of its 
demand function and, consequently, increase its profits margins. Very often product and 
process innovations will go together and complement on their effect since, for example, a 
product innovation may demand for a process innovation to respond to a new product design or 
characteristic. 
More difficult is to establish, in general, if there may be differences between the size of 
the innovation rents attributed to one type of innovation or the other. It may be argued, 
however, that product innovations will be more easy to imitate since competitors will be 
immediately aware of them and patent law may not be able to effectively protect the property 
rights of the innovator. On the other hand, process innovations are not exteriorized by the 
innovating firm and therefore rival firms may take time before discovering the origin of a 
particular competitive advantage. All these reasons may suggest that the innovating rents of 
process innovations will tend to be higher than the rents of product innovations, assuming that 
both innovations have the same degree of "radicality". 
The size of innovation rents will not only be affected by the nature of the innovation 
but also by the conditions of the market in which the innovating firm operates. Among those 
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conditions the degree of rivalry or market competition is particularly emphasised in the 
literature. 
The "Schumpeterian" view of innovation argues that monopoly power will foster 
innovation activity because it is a way of assuming that innovation rents will be substantial and 
that they will last over time as imitation is limited by entry barriers into the market. A firm with 
market power and a monopolistic position will be subject to an "efficiency effect" in the sense 
that innovation will be perceived as the only way to protect its privileged position in the 
market. A potential entrant, on the other hand, will anticipate a lower compensation for its 
innovation activities since, after entry, a competitive process with the incumbent monopolist 
will take place.4 
There exists, however, an opposite vIew of the relationship between market 
competition and innovation rents build around the so called "replacement effect", Arrow 
(1962). If we start with a competitive market where price equals cost and profits are zero, then 
if innovation is sufficiently important to give market power to the innovating firm, the new 
equilibrium price will be higher than the innovator's cost and profits will increase substantially. 
On the other hand, if the market is non competitive, prices are above costs and firms earn 
positive profits, an innovation will increase profits but in a lower amount since current firms 
are already making positive profits. In this case, a monopolist which innovates will end up 
replacing itself, while when the market is competitive innovation may change the market 
structure towards a monopoly with substantial increase in profits. All this implies that 
innovations should produce higher rents in firms operating in more competitive markets since 
in such markets initial profits are expected to be lower. 
The relationship between market competition and innovation rents is, therefore, an 
empirical question. To guide the empirical research some auxiliary hypothesis have been 
4See Gilbert and Newbery (1982). 
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formulated. For example, Kamien and Schwartz (1970) show that, under the replacement effect 
assumption, innovation rents will increase with the absolute value of the price-elasticity of 
demand, i.e., they will be higher for firms facing more elastic demand functions. One of the 
reason a firm faces a more elastic demand curve is because there are more substitutes in the 
market, that is, the market itself is more competitive. 
The analysis of Kamien and Schwartz is based upon the assumption of a process 
innovation that lowers production costs. If the cost reduction is translated into lower prices, 
then the size of the market served will expand more as the demand function is also more price-
elastic. This will in turn determine a positive association between innovation rents and price-
elasticity of demand. But when the innovation is in product but not in process, then Spence 
(1975) shows that improvements in product quality will produce higher innovation rents in 
markets with more inelastic demands, since they will allow for higher margins. Therefore, the 
relationship between innovation rents and price-elasticity of demand may be sensitive to the 
type of innovation being considered. 
One more market characteristic that we want to consider is the demand growth. 
Schmookler (1966) argues in favour of the growth in market demand as the primary force 
behind technological change. Walsh (1984) elaborates around this idea and points towards the 
fact that innovation activity requires high investment cost which do not depend upon the 
demand of the product once the innovation is made. Given the indivisibility of the innovation 
costs and investments, innovating rents will depend largely on the size and growth of the 
market for the final products. This will be true for both, product and process innovations. 
So far, our attention has been focused on the generation of innovating rents, but for 
methodological reasons it is important to consider also their distribution. The innovation 
process will contribute to improvements in products and processes which in turn will increase 
the value added by conventional inputs such as labour and physical capital. Therefore, 
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innovation should contribute to improvements in total factor productivity. Productivity gains 
will be, in turn, distributed in the form of higher profits or/and higher wages. When labour 
markets are competitive, then the productivity gains of innovation will show up in terms of 
higher profits and consequently the measurement and evaluation of innovation rents can be 
made either from total factor productivity gains or from increases in profitability. But when 
workers have bargaining power and capture part of the productivity gains in terms of higher 
wages, then innovation rents are no longer equal to increments in profitability. As we shall 
show later on in the empirical section, to account for the issue of appropriability will be very 
important in order to properly evaluate the rents of innovations from differences in 
profitability. 
2.1. A simpie/ormalisation 
The exposition above may be formalised in a simple model which will be helpful in the 
specification of the empirical equations. 
Define the quasi-rents of the firm i in a period t as 
[I] 
where Pit is the price, Qit is the output, Weit is the competitive salary, Lit is the number of 
employees, lit is the market cost of capital and Kit is the physical capital. QRil includes the 
economic profits plus the costs of the innovation activities which are considered sunk costs. 
The assumption that the costs of innovation are sunk allows us to talk about quasi-rents instead 
of rents of innovation. 
The quasi-rents per unit of monetary output, QRi!PitQit are assumed to be a function of 
the stock of knowledge capital, Gj{, and of market conditions, Mit, i.e., 
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[2] 
For each firm and time period only accounting profits are observed. Therefore it is 
important to link II(Git, M;J with such profits. Define gross profit margin as, 
[3] 
where Wit are salaries actually paid. It can be easily shown that mit and IIit are related by, 
= D. (G M) + ri~ Kil _ (Wil - wi~)Lil 
mit 11 11' 11 Q Q Pit il PiI il 
[4] 
In other words, gross profit margin from accounting profits will be equal to quasi-rents 
plus the costs of physical capital minus the differences between labour costs at actual and at 
competitive salaries, all ofthem normalised by the monetary value ofthe firm's output. 
The stock of capital knowledge, Gil, is the result of a continuos innovation process. The 
underlying assumption is that G is generated by a permanent inventory process ofthe form, 
[5] 
where lit is the number of innovations incorporated into the stock in period t and 0 is the rate of 
depreciation. 5 The (expected) number of innovations generated by firm i in period t will be the 
M 
result of a search process over time, E(1il) = I a III Sit_Ill , where am is a parameter of the 
111=1 
effectiveness of the research process and Sit-m is the intensity of research in a given period of 
5 Alternatively, we could assume that the knowledge stock is constructed using the R&D expenditure as 
Griliches and Mairesse (1984) proposed. 
6 Reinganum (1989) presents a good survey of the dynamic models of technological activities. Blundell et 
al (1995) provide an empirical test of the relationship between innovation inputs and outputs. 
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Product market conditions, Mit will affect both, economic profits and the quasi-rents of 
innovation. Our underlying assumption is that firms compete in an oligopolistic market with 
product differentiation. Efficiency in production across firms will determine part of their 
competitive advantages, while market concentration and demand growth may affect the 
opportunities for collusive behaviour. On the other hand,. product market conditions are 
expected to affect the size of the innovation quasi-rents. All this may be summarised in the 
following assumptions, 
82mi/ 
8Mil 8Gil 
[6] 
where the particular sign of the cross derivative is determined by the theoretical predictions 
outlined above. For example, from Schmoockler's predictions we expect that the cross 
derivative between innovations, quasi-rents and demand growth will be positive. 
The competitive cost of capital, rCit is, in general, difficult to observe and this will have 
to be taken into consideration in the empirical analysis. Finally, the difference between actual 
and competitive salaries, (Wit-WCit), will be considered in this paper as a measure of the 
innovations rents and quasi-rents captured by the workers in terms of higher salaries. The 
particular measure used to estimate the magnitude of the appropriation wiII be discussed in the 
empirical section. 
3. The empirical model and variables measurement 
Following the theoretical analysis of the previous section, the model to be estimated is 
summarised as follows 
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where mit is the gross profit margin, mit-l is the lagged gross profit margin, G it is the set of 
innovation variables, M;t is the set of variables proxies of market and efficiency conditions, 
Git *Nit is the interaction between innovation and a subset Nit of the market conditions variables, 
KSAit is the ratio of physical capital to sales, ~t is the set of variables about the innovation 
quasi-rents appropriated by the workers, Yit is a set of other control variables and Eit is the error 
term. 
The dependent variable, mit, is measured as the percentage of gross margin over total 
value of production for firm i in period t; gross margin is equal to the value of production 
minus costs of inputs from other firms and minus labour costs; the value of production is equal 
to sales plus changes in inventories.7 The regression includes the lagged value of the gross 
profit margin among the explanatory variables, in order to capture the time-varying effects 
which are further away from the equilibrium solution8; for example, lagged profit margins 
could capture the influence of cash-flows attached to profitability on innovation activity, since 
more or less cash-flows implies more or less funds available to finance innovation activities. 
The variables of innovation activity, Git, are measured in terms of three dummy 
variables, PROD, PROC and BOTH. The variable PROD takes the value of one when the firm i 
indicates that, in period t, a product innovation has taken place, and takes the value of zero 
otherwise; the variable PROC and BOTH are defined in a similar way but when a process 
innovation, PROC, and both a product and a process innovation, BOTH, are reported by the 
firm. 
7For a good explanation of the construction of this variable see Farifias and Huergo (1994) and Huergo 
(1994) with the same data base, the ESEE. 
BGeroski et al. (1993) present a similar specification although the dependent variable is the rate of return. 
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Innovation activity is measured in terms of output flow. This measure is preferred to 
other variables often used as inputs of the innovation activity, such as R&D expenditures or 
R&D personnel, because innovation output is not always the result of formal innovation 
processes.9 Innovation counts are also preferred to other measures of output, such as number of 
patents, since there are many innovations which are no patented by the firms. to The choice of 
an output, such as a number flow instead of a stock measure of knowledge, has been imposed 
by data· limitations. To obtain a more accurate measure of the knowledge base it would have 
been desirable to take into account not only whether the firm reports innovation in product, 
process or both, but also the actual number of each innovations (ideally their economic value as 
well). With such information the stock Git could have been computed using equation [5]. 
Unfortunately such number of innovations is only available in our data base for product 
innovations. 
If innovation activities generate quasi-rents, then a positive value of the vector [3, is 
expected. Moreover, the size of the [31 coefficient for the variable PROD, PROC and BOTH 
will indicate whether innovation quasi-rents are different or not for each type of innovation. 
The model considers two main variables to account for firm heterogeneity in terms of 
productive efficiency and market competition, market share, SHARE, and industry 
concentration, CR4. More efficient firms will capture higher market share and therefore ex-post 
differences in market share may be good proxies of differences in efficiency across firms. 
Collusion tends to be easier in more concentrated markets and therefore we would expect that 
firms in more concentrated markets will earn higher profits. However, if differences in 
9Each measure presents problems: the number of people involved on R&D activities ignores resource 
flows from research equipment and materials, while the R&D expenditures include purchases that do not 
confer significant technological advances to the firm, i.e. the long lived equipment. 
IOTownsend et al. (1981), Pavitt et al. (1987) or Robson et al. (1988) and, more recently, Blundell et al. 
(1995) use the number of innovations developed by the firms. The main problem of this indicator is the 
difficulty in identifying the significant innovations, which implies the numerous biases derived of the 
waste heterogeneity in the economic value of innovations. On the other hand, patent counts (Scherer 
(1965), Bound et al. (1984), Griliches (1990» cause problems in the comparison within-industry and 
between-industry because they are heterogeneous in economic value, as well. 
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efficiency across firms in the market are important, then a more concentrated market will be the 
result of differences in efficiency and market share across firms, and not evidence of collusion 
practices. One way to isolate the efficiency or collusion effects of concentration on profits is to 
incorporate into the regression the product of market share and concentration, SHARE*CR4. 
With all this in mind, the vector Mit will include three variables, SHARE, CR4 and SHACR4. 
The variable SHARE is measured as the ratio of sales of firm i in period t over total 
industry sales (at the two digits level) in the same time period. Concentration, CR4, on the 
other hand, is measured as the percentages of sales of the four largest firms in the industry over 
total industry sales, both in each time period t. Under the assumption that differences in 
concentration across industries respond to efficiency effects, we expect that the coefficient of 
SHACR4 will be negative. On the other hand, a positive coefficient of the interactive variable 
could be an indication that concentration facilitates collusion and this is the reason why profits 
are higher in more concentrated markets. Smirlock (1985) tests similar hypothesis in a study 
related to banking firms. 
The innovation variables, PROD, PROC and BOTH are interacted with proxies of 
market conditions such as growth, elasticity of demand and competition. Firms in the data base 
indicate whether their products are sold in a recessive market or not. Using this information, we 
define the dummy variable RECES which takes the value of one if the firm responds 
affirmatively to the question about recessive markets and zero otherwise. According to the 
theory outlined in section two, innovation rents are lower in market with low demand growth 
and, consequently, we expect that the coefficient of the interactive variables RECPROD 
(RECES*PROD), RECPROC (RECES*PROC), and RECBOTH (RECES*BOTH) will be 
negative. 
Price-elasticity of demand is not directly observed, but the data base informs us about 
the characteristics of the products sold by the firms. In particular, firms collaborating with the 
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ESEE survey indicate whether their products are standarised or not. Accordingly, the dummy 
variable EP is defined which takes the value of one when the firm's products are standarised 
and zero otherwise. The underlying assumption is that standarised products face a more elastic 
demand and, according to the theory, the interaction variable EPPROC should have a positive 
coefficient in the regression (higher innovation rents for process innovations). On the other 
hand, if product innovations imply improvements in product quality, then the innovation could 
contribute to differentiate the product and increase profit margins. But it is also true that profit 
margins of standarised profits will tend to be lower to begin with and therefore, in this case, 
quality improvements tend to imply lower incremental profits. All this implies that the 
coefficients of EPPROD and EPBOTH have an ambiguous sign. 
The third market characteristics that may affect the size of the innovation rents is the 
intensity of product market competition. Market competition is approximated by market 
concentration, in an inverse way. With this is mind, the variables PRODCR4, PROCCR4, and 
BOTHCR4 are constructed. Their coefficients will indicate whether there is an effect of market 
concentration on the size of innovations rents. A positive value of such coefficient would be 
consistent with the "efficiency effect", in the sense that firms in more concentrated markets 
tend to capture more rents because there is less imitation. On the other hand, a negative 
coefficient would be consistent with the "replacement effect". 
The variable KSA jt is equal to the ratio between the monetary value of physical capital 
(total assets at replacement costs) and the monetary value of production of the firm i in period 
t. 11 We expect a coefficient 134 positive, according to the theoretical model. 
In Martinez-Ros (1995) a direct measure of the wage differential (Wit-Wcit) attributed to 
the capture of innovation rents by the workers in terms of higher wages, is provided. To obtain 
such indicator, we first regress the firm average wage on innovation variables distinguishing 
11 See Martin and Smirez (1996). 
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between product, process innovations and both and other human capital controls. Then, we take 
the three p estimates corresponding to the innovation variables and multiply them by the 
PROD, PROD and BOTH dummy variables. In this procedure we are assuming that the only 
factor that contributes to increase wages is the introduction of some technological advance. 
Notice, however, that in the theoretical model the wage differential is multiplied by the inverse 
of labour productivity. The new variables included in the Xit vector of the econometric model, 
BPRODLSA, BPROCLSA, BBOTHLSA are constructed as the product of the estimated wage 
differential times the inverse of labour productivity. According to the theoretical model the 
coefficients in the vector P5 are expected to be negative 
Two additional control variables are included in the regression; vector Yit: export 
activity of the firm and technological activity in the industry. Export activity is measured by a 
dummy variable which takes the value of one if the firm exports and zero otherwise, DEXP; 
with this variable we control for differences in margins attributed to differences in the scope of 
markets served by the firm. On the other hand, firms may profit from spillovers coming from 
the research activities performed by other firms in the same industry. To account for this, the 
variable KPROD is defined and introduced into the equation. The variable counts the number 
of product innovations generated by all firms in a given two-digit industry and computes a 
stock of knowledge using equation [5].12 
The error term Eit includes unobservable firm specific effects, Il;, and random-time 
varying effects, Vit, i.e. Eit = Il; + Vit. The firm specific effects may be justified by the fact that 
the managerial choice of the strategy for a particular firm, will be related with the sources of 
profits in the past. Since the error term Eit will be correlated with the lagged dependent variable 
because of the fixed time invariant effect, Il;, the econometric estimation will have to account 
12The depreciation rate is the 30%. The novelty of this indicator is the use of an output measure to capture 
the spiIJovers effect. Geroski et al. (1993) have yet tried for the UK while Levin and Reiss (1988) have 
done for the US but using R&D expenditures. Results are very different according to the variable used, 
while for the UK the effect is small and imprecise, for the US the effects are important and significant. 
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for this correlation in order to avoid estimation biases. One way to solve this problem is to 
transform the variables in first differences and use differences in t-2 values of the dependent 
variables as valid instruments of the variable in t-l; Anderson and Hsiao (1982), Arellano and 
Bond (1991). 
A more recently developed method of solution, Arellano and Bover (1995), instruments 
the lagged variable, mil' with I1mil_l; the efficiency of estimation is now increased, and as long 
as there is no serial correlation in the error term, the estimated coefficients are consistent 
estimators. The estimation procedure also takes into account that market share will be 
endogenous and jointly determined with profit margins; for this reason market share is 
instrumented by its lagged value. 13 
4. Descriptive statistics of the data 
The data used to estimate the empirical model and to test the hypothesis outlined above, 
come from the survey ESEE and covers the time period 1990-1993. A balanced panel of the 
data consisting of 973 firms with four time periods is available. Table I presents descriptive 
statistics of the dependent and explanatory variables for the whole sample and two subsamples, 
each one selected taking into account the innovation activity of each firms in along time. The 
data in column headed Output in R&D is selected using an indicator of innovation (whether 
product or process innovation is carried out). Column under the heading Input of R&D includes 
all observations with positive R&D expenditures. Obviously, the sample size is different 
because not all firms investing in R&D have success in terms of some innovation output. In 
fact, we could observe that only 65 percent of the firms that invest get some result. It confirms 
the idea that not all investment in R&D is traduced directly in technological advances. 
I3See Geroski et al. (1993). 
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Since we are interested in this paper in the effects of innovation (among other 
varaibles) on margins, we are going to analyse in more detail these statistics. Profits of 
innovating firms are very similar to those of non-innovating ones. Moreover, there are not 
differences in profits amongst firms grouped according to innovation inputs or outputs. These 
crude descriptive statistics seem to suggest that there will not be effects of innovating variables 
(whether input or output) on margins when using unconditional measures. However, when we 
evaluate profit profiles conditional on other variables, we could observe different results. They 
are reported in Figure 1. We compute margins conditional on firm size using the whole sample 
and the two quoted subsamples, in an attempt to separate firms investing in R&D from those 
getting succes of its investment (although we must keep in mind that there are firms common to 
both samples). We must note that profit figures are different because they reflect average 
values calculated using different number of firms in each sample. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of the Variables 
Variable 
Margin (M) 
Market Share 
(SHARE) 
Concentration 
(CR4) 
Export (DEXP) 
Capital (KSA) 
Knowledge capital 
PROD 
PROC 
BOTH 
Knowledge 
I produced (KPROD) 
Technological effort 
(EFFORT) 
Number of 
observations 
Definition 
Added value less cost 
production divided by total 
production 
Total firm sales divided by 
two-digit industry total 
sales of the sample 
Four-firm two-digit 
industry concentration 
ratio by sales 
Dummy equal to 1 if firm 
exports 
Capital divided by total 
firm sales 
Dummy equals to 1 if firm 
carries out only product 
innovation 
Dummy equals to I if firm 
carries out only process 
innovation 
Dummy equals to I if firm 
carries out both product 
and process innovation 
Total number of 
innovations produced in 
two digit industries 
R&D expenditure over 
total firm sales 
I. Variable constructed using equation [5] 
All firms 
Mean 
(Std.Dev.) 
0.108 
(0.143) 
0.035 
(0.125) 
0.215 
(0.204) 
0.544 
(0.498) 
6.177 
(27.48) 
0.096 
(0.294) 
0.151 
(0.358) 
0.159 
(0.366) 
3.809 
(5.543) 
0.007 
(0.022) 
3892 
Output of 
R&D2. 
Mean 
(Std.Dev.) 
0.107 
(0.135) 
0.053 
(0.164) 
0.233 
(0.211) 
0.707 
(0.455) 
2.734 
(11.07) 
0.236 
(0.425) 
0.372 
(0.484) 
0.392 
(0.488) 
4.073 
(5.429) 
0.012 
(0.026) 
1580 
Input of 
R&D3 
Mean 
(Std.Dev.) 
0.104 
(0.142) 
0.073 
(0.184 
0.233 
(0.202) 
0.844 
(0.363) 
1.328 
(7.432) 
0.138 
(0.345) 
0.186 
(0.390) 
0.325 
(0.469) 
3.472 
(4.387) 
0.020 
(0.033) 
1442 
2. Innovating firms have been selected if they have developed some innovation along the period 
independing of the innovation type. 
3. Innovating firms have been selected using the technological effort as indicator. 
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In other to draw average profits and size of the firm, we define six size intervals. 1: 
firms with less than 20 workers. 2: between 21 and 50. 3: between 51 and 100. 4: between 101 
and 200.5: between 201 and 500. 6: more than 500 workers. 
0.125 i 
0.115t"'--~\-
0.095 
0.085 
0.105
1 0.075 -I----+-I ---.....,11-----+----+-----1 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Firm Size 
Figure 1. Average Profit Margins according to firm size. 
-+- input firms 
-11- output firms 
total firms 
Although the profiles are rather similar, the average margins by firm size are different 
in the three samples. Those firms with less than 100 workers present higher profits on average 
than large firms independent of the sample. Figures by innovation type lead to interesting 
findings. Using the third size interval as a threshold, we observe an inverse tendency when 
using an input or an output to select the sample. Average profits of small firms are higher when 
we use the output of innovation while the reverse occurs with large companies. This evidence 
confirms the specificity of Spanish firms in terms not only of the effects of size on innovation 
variables (see Labeaga and Martinez-Ros, 1996) but in terms of the effects of size on other 
variables. Finally, when computing profits conditional on variables as market share or exports, 
the results are also very different. This suggests that several of the conditionings in Table 1 (in 
addition to innovation variables) must help to explain the profits of Spanish manufacturing 
firms. 
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5. Model estimation 
The estimation of the model is perfonned in two steps. First, we measure the size of 
innovation rents and second we investigate their relationship with market characteristics. 
According to the first column of Table 2 all the explanatory variables not related with 
innovation activity have statistically significant coefficients. Besides, all these coefficients are 
positive, except the one for the interactive variable SHACR4 which is negative. This means 
that firm's profits are sensible to market and finns characteristics. The coefficient of the lagged 
dependent variables is 0.229 and highly significative, therefore the short run effects of the 
explanatory variables on the profit margins are approximately one fifth of their long run effects. 
Profits margins are positively associated with market share and with market concentration; the 
negative coefficient of the interactive variable indicates that market share and market 
concentration are related with profits through the efficiency effect. To be an exporter and to 
. operate in sector with more innovative activity have positive effects on profits. The positive 
coefficient of KSA indicates that part of the gross profit margins go to pay a competitive cost 
of capital. 
Column two of Table 2 shows the same results after the innovation variables have been 
included in the regression. 14 The coefficients of the innovation variables are, as expected, 
positive and highly significative. The coefficients of the rest of the explanatory variables are 
slightly reduced, but all remain statistically significant except the one for the variable market 
share. The effect of both types of innovation on quasi-rents are not homogenous. At 14 percent 
level of significance we reject the null hypothesis 13prod = 13proc. 1 5 
14The highly significance of the three technical variables included in the estimation confirms the 
hypothesis of no homogenous innovation activity pointed out by Kamien and Schwartz (J 982), Lunn 
(1986) or Kraft (1990) among others. 
IS It is a tipical F-test with one degree offreedom in the numerator corresponding to one restriction. 
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Table 2. Profit Margins and Innovationsl ,2 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
MARGINt_1 0.229 (4.18) 0.232 (4.31) 0.227 (4.20) 
SHARE 0.336 (1.70) 0.303 (1.55) 0.267 (1.37) 
CR4 0.079 (4.99) 0.064 (4.12) 0.064 (4.10) 
SHACR4 -1.012 (2.39) -0.952 (2.30) -0.902 (2.20) 
DEXP 0.030 (3.98) 0.018 (2.30) 0.016 (2.06) 
KPROD 0.001 (3.27) 0.001 (2.79) 0.001 (3.16) 
KSA*10 0.002 (1.90) 0.002 (2.03) 0.002 (2.25) 
PROD 0.026 (2.68) 0.048 (3.01) 
PROC 0.039 (4.43) 0.065 (4.19) 
BOTH 0.029 (3.24) 0.059 (3.30) 
BPRODLSA -0.081 (1.77) 
BPROCLSA -0.087 (1.67) 
BBOTHLSA -0.045 (1.65) 
Wald test 28.17(3) 24.20 (3) 27.63 (3) 
Sample size 3892 3892 3892 
Notes. 
I. t-statistics robust to heteroskedasticity. 
2. All regressions pass the hypothesis of joint significance of regressors using the 
Wald test. 
.., Wald test is different in each specification: in (1) refers to CR4, SHARE and ,). 
SHACR4; (2) and (3) to innovation variables. 
The last column of Table 2 introduces into the estimation the variables which take into 
account that part of the innovation quasi-rents go to the workers in terms of higher wages. The 
coefficients of these variables are negative and statistically significative as predicted by the 
theoretical model. But the most important result is now that the coefficients of the innovation 
variables are almost twice their value of column two. When we control for the rents that are 
captured by the workers, then differences in profit margins attributed to differences in 
innovation output are equivalent to the effect of innovation in total factor productivity. The 
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results show that innovation quasi-rents in terms of total factor productivity, are substantially 
higher than those associated with differences in profit margins (column two). 
The final step in the estimation of the model is to investigate if the size of the 
innovation quasi-rents are sensible to characteristics to the product market. Table 3 shows the 
result of estimating the model with the interactive variables Git*Nit among the explanatory 
ones. As expected, innovation quasi-rents are lower for firms selling products in recessive 
markets than for firms in non-recessive ones (column one of Table 3). This is true specially for 
process innovation and for both, product and process innovations together, since the coefficient 
of REPROD is non statistically significant. Therefore product innovation seem to be equally 
effective in generating quasi-rents in growing and in non growing markets. 
Product standardisation only affects the size of innovation quasi-rents, with respect to 
the rents of non standarised (i.e. differentiated) products, for joint product and process 
innovations together. The positive coefficient indicates that joint product and process 
innovations generate more quasi-rents when products are standarised than otherwise. As we 
indicated above, product standardisation implies, ceteris paribus, higher price-elasticity of 
demand. Either type of innovation alone does not appear sufficient to affect quasi-rents 
differently from non standarised products, but when both innovations together take place, then 
the opportunity to lower price and expand demand (from process innovation) and the 
opportunity to soften competition improving the product (from product innovation) produce 
higher innovation quasi-rents in firms with standarised products than in firms with non 
standarised ones. 
Market concentration affects the size of innovation quasi-rents 111 a negative and 
statistically significant way, column three of Table 3. 16 This is true specially for process 
16We were concern about the possibility that concentration were endogenous but, a Hausman test (F = 
0.00078) allows us to reject the null hypothesis of endogeneity at any significance level. 
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innovations and for both, product and process innovations. As more concentrated markets are 
considered also as markets where competition is less intense, then the empirical evidence is in 
favour of the replacement effect: innovation quasi-rents are higher in more competitive markets 
because firms start with lower profits before the innovation takes place. 
The last column of Table 3 shows the estimated coefficients of the model when all the 
variables are included. Now collinearity effects are more severe, but the basic results obtained 
step by step are maintained. 
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Table 3. Innovation Rents and Market Conditions1,2 
Variables Demand Product Market All effects 
growth standardisation competition jointly 
MARGINt_1 0.244 (4.59) 0.248 (4.65) 0.229 (4.30) 0.247 (4.70) 
SHARE 0.277 (1.31) 0.251 (1.22) 0.215 (1.07) 0.229 (1.07) 
CR4 0.061 (3.76) 0.060 (3.70) 0.092 (4.93) 0.085 (4.47) 
SHACR4 -0.904 (1.90) -0.877 (I.91) -0.756 (1.78) -0.777 (1.65) 
DEXP 0.013 (1.71) 0.014 (1.79) 0.011 (1.50) 0.010(1.31) 
KPROD 0.001 (3.08) 0.001 (3.05) 0.001 (2.55) 0.001 (2.59) 
KSA*10 0.002 (2.30) 0.002 (2.29) 0.002 (1.83) 0.002 (1.95) 
PROD 0.051 (3.54) 0.036 (1.96) 0.066 (3.14) 0.060 (2.57) 
PROC 0.074 (4.56) 0.050 (2.60) 0.106 (5.26) 0.099 (4.36) 
BOTH 0.079 (4.51) 0.038 (I.68) 0.083 (3.74) 0.074 (2.81) 
BPRODLSA -0.077 (1.69) -0.082 (l.80) -0.085 (1.88) -0.083 (1.81) 
BPROCLSA -0.072 (1.35) -0.075 (1.43) -0.104 (1.98) -0.082 (1.53) 
BBOTHLSA -0.037 (1.37) -0.051 (1.88) -0.046 (1.75) -0.037 (1.40) 
RECPROD -0.014 (0.86) -0.011 (0.68) 
RECPROC -0.032 (2.11) -0.028 (1.96) 
RECBOTH -0.060 (4.08) -0.058 (3.93) 
EPPROD 0.011 (0.63) 0.011 (0.65) 
EPPROC 0.021 (1.40) 0.016 (1.10) 
EPBOTH 0.035 (2.06) 0.031 (1.91) 
PRODCR4 -0.070 (1.63) -0.071 (1.54) 
PROCCR4 -0.127 (3.49) -0.111 (3.11) 
BOTHCR4 -0.087 (2.13) -0.066 (1.56) 
Wald test"' 38.67 (3) 10.91 (3) 35.46 (3) 24.12 (3) 
Sample size 3692 3692 3892 3692 
Notes. 
\. t-statistics robust to heteroskedasticity. 
2. All regressions pass the hypothesis of joint significance of regressors using the Wald test. 
.., We test the significance of the three innovation variables . ". 
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6. Conclusions 
This paper has addressed two main questions: do innovations generate quasi-rents?; are 
the size of quasi-rents affected by market conditions? The answer to both questions is yes. 
Product, process and both innovations generate quasi rents and such quasi-rents appears to be 
higher for process innovations. The size of innovation quasi-rents seems to be affected 
positively by demand growth, by product standardisation, and by low product market 
concentration. The three empirical results are in agreement with the theoretical predictions such 
as the Schmoockler's theory of demand-pool innovation, the price-elasticity of demand effects 
of Kamien and Schwartz and the replacement effect of Arrow. Process innovations are more 
affected by market conditions than the rest of innovations, at the time of generating quasi-rents. 
The previous empirical results are obtained from a panel data of Spanish manufacturing 
firms during the period 1990-93. The econometric estimation has controlled for long-run 
effects and has corrected for endogeneity problems as well as for the correlation between 
explanatory variables and the error term. Other important methodological aspects of the paper 
are that innovation activity is measured in terms of output and that the estimation of the size of 
innovation quasi-rents has taken into account how such quasi-rents are distributed between 
higher wages and higher profits. This means that the final estimation of innovation quasi-rents 
is a measure of the contribution of innovation to total factor productivity. From another 
perspective, our results remark the biases that may be incurred if innovation quasi-rents are 
measured only in terms of differences in firm's profitability. 
The results of the paper have important implications. First, the fact that innovation 
generates quasi-rents raises the issue of why some firms innovate and the other do not. We can 
not answer this question but notice that the costs of innovation are not incorporated into the 
analysis because they are treated as sunk costs. Therefore for some firms the expected quasi-
rents ex-post may not be sufficient to cover the costs ex-ante and decide not to carry out format 
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and costly innovation activities. One interesting extension of the paper would be to investigate 
whether the conditions that favour higher quasi-rents ex-post are also the conditions that tend to 
induce higher investment of resources in innovation activity ex-ante. 
The evidence that innovation quasi-rents are partially captured by the workers in terms 
of higher wages may be, in principle, contrary to invest resources in innovation activity since 
the workers do not pay for such investments. But the higher wages may be a way of 
incentivating the workers to actively participate in incremental innovations (such as those 
which are part of Total Quality Management practices). If this was the case, higher wages 
would be a way of stimulating innovations and, ex-post, innovation activity may be even higher 
than when workers do not participate of the innovation gains. To analyse the relationship 
between innovation activity and the share of innovation quasi-rents would be another important 
extension of the paper. 
Our results show that product innovations may be more effective, in terms of 
generating quasi-rents, than process innovations, for firms which operate in recessive markets. 
Therefore, the innovation strategy of a particular firm should be designed taking into account 
market conditions such as demand growth. The same recommendation can be made for firms 
which produce and sell standarised products; these firms may obtain higher innovation quasi-
rents than firms that differentiate their products, if they introduce product and process 
innovations. So, the marginal returns of innovation appears to be higher in firms with 
standarised products, probably because firms that have already differentiated their products 
obtained the higher incremental gains of innovation in the past. 
Market concentration lowers innovation quasi-rents, specially for process innovations. 
If market concentration is an inverse measure of market competition, then innovation quasi-
rents, and presumably innovation activity, are positively associated with product market 
competition. This result is in favour of the thesis postulated by Arrow and contrary to 
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Schumpeter's hypothesis: Firms in competitive markets obtain a higher price from innovation 
because their starting level of profits is low. This result has implications for competition policy 
since dynamic efficiency appears also positively associated with product market competition. 
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APPENDIX 1 
In this appendix we present more descriptives of the behaviour of the innovating firms. 
Two tables are reported. The Table A.I.I. describes the average profits according to firm size 
while Table A.I.2. describes also the average profits but using firm product activity. In both 
tables we consider the different forms that firms carry out innovation. In particular, we separate 
whether firms engage or/and hires innovation activity. 
Table A.I.I. Average profits by firm size and innovation types 
period 1990-931 
Non- Only engage Only hire Engage 
innovating innovations innovations hire 
and 
innovations 
Group 1. less than 20 10.59 12.37 10.88 11.46 
workers (981) (49) (22) (32) 
Group 2. between 20 11.40 14.89 10.02 9.15 
and 50 (710) (76) (24) (55) 
Group 3. between 50 11.84 11.l7 16.79 8.64 
and lOO (190) (63) (25) (26) 
Group 4. between 100 9.47 10.51 13.97 9.12 
and 200 (167) (66) (IS) (52) 
Group 5. between 200 11.01 10.74 12.91 9.44 
and 500 (303) (290) (42) (244) 
Group 6. more than 500 12.59 10.86 14.39 7.44 
workers (90) (146) (11 ) (213) 
Total 10.97 11.36 13.02 8.77 
(2441) (690) (139) (622) 
Notes 
I. In brackets are reported the number of observations. 
It is interesting to observe that the values of profits are very different depending on the 
way the innovation activity is carried out. I7 Not all firms that engage innovations hire 
technological services outside the firm but, the number of firms which produce innovation are 
17 We consider to develop innovation activity if firm hires or engages some technological innovation 
without distinguishing a priori the innovation types (product or process). 
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larger than those which produce and hire innovation jointly. Attending to the average profits, 
the conclusions do not follow a similar pattern neither in size nor in innovation contract. 
In general, we can affirm that companies which only hire innovations are more 
profitable although, if we observe along the size intervals, the very small firms present margins 
down those of firms which engage innovation. It is in this last size group (1 and 2) jointly with 
group 3 where profits on average are larger than in the rest of intervals. The analysis of the 
results attending to the figures of the cross-tabulation offers relevant findings. Specifically, the 
very small firms which engage innovations report the largest mark-ups while the reverse occurs 
for firms which only hire the technological activity. Surprisingly, firms with less than 20 
employees which combine the hire and the engage of innovations have the largest margin 
compared with the rest of size intervals. However, in any case the margins of this third column 
are bigger than those of the first column. It seems clear that if we draw the figures of this table 
we would observe a different curve for each innovation category according to the size. 
The second table summarises average profits by industries. We observe that not 
necessarily the average profits in non-innovating firms are smaller that those in innovating 
ones. For instance, non innovating firms belonging to the Electric products sector reports the 
largest mark-up. Chemical and Food and beverages have larger margins independently of 
whether firm engage or hire the innovation activity. It is notice to mention the margin of 21 
percent that presents the Food and beverages industry when only hires innovation. It could 
indicate that the technological opportunity in this industry is high likely due to the easily 
diffusion of some new product or process introduced in the market. 
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Table A.l.2. Average profits by sector and innovation types 
period 1990-931 
Non- Only engage Only hire Engage and 
innovating innovations innovations hire 
innovations 
Chemical products 12.80 13.28 12.82 10.71 
(599) (170) (39) (216) 
Electric products 11.83 7.65 6.92 8.03 
(162) (110) (9) (115) 
Mechanical 8.77 10.07 11.01 3.48 
(202) (126) (13) (127) 
Food and Beverages 11.11 13.36 21.28 13.74 
(465) (115) (22) (62) 
Leather, wooden and 10.12 11.43 11.36 9.08 
paper products (1013) (169) (56) (102) 
Total 10.97 11.36 13.02 8.77 
(2441) (690) (139) (622) 
Notes. 
1. In brackets are reported the number of observations. 
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